Governance, construction, and regulation: the three pillars of failure highlighted by the Grenfell Tower Inquiry (GTI) which led to the tragedy. What went wrong? Why did it happen? Are we now safe from such disasters? This article compiles the key findings from the GTI, outlining what you need to know.
The Cause
The final report of the Grenfell Inquiry, led by Sir Martin Moore-Bick, bluntly stated that this disaster could and should have been prevented. Seventy-two people lost their lives, and many more were affected by the devastating fire that spread rapidly throughout the building. The rapid spread of the fire was mainly due to the materials used in the building’s refurbishment, like Aluminium Composite Material (ACM) cladding with a polyethylene core and combustible insulation, which drastically escalated the fire.
The Grenfell disaster's fire alarms were limited to individual flats, designed to alert only occupants within that specific flat without an interconnected building-wide alarm system. This lack of a central alarm system meant there was no efficient way to communicate a building-wide evacuation, significantly hampering the London Fire Brigade's ability to advise residents of changing safety instructions during the fire.
The polyethylene-filled cladding panels were the main cause of the fire's spread, with experiments showing that they contributed more significantly to the fire than the phenolic and polyisocyanurate insulation used in the walls. While the insulation materials did retain heat and contributed to the fire’s growth, it was the ACM panels that exacerbated the disaster. Notably, panels installed in cassette form were found to perform far worse in fire conditions than those attached with rivets.
These findings highlight how industry reliance on flawed safety assessments and inappropriate materials can have dire consequences. For decades, the construction industry has used these materials, trusting in inadequate safety regulations and tests, such as BS 8414. As the inquiry points out, these tests did not provide the necessary information to evaluate how external wall systems would perform in a real fire .
The Blame Game
The Grenfell Report placed significant blame on Studio E, the architectural practice responsible for the tower's refurbishment. While Studio E has commented on their role in previous statements, the inquiry criticised the firm’s misunderstanding of its obligations as lead consultant, particularly in coordinating the design process and ensuring compliance with building regulations. Studio E argued that fire safety measures were the responsibility of other parties involved. However, the report notes that they deferred too much responsibility to subcontractors and building control officers, without fully ensuring that all design and construction met safety standards.
The report uncovered evidence of widespread dishonesty within the manufacturing and certification of construction materials. The cladding and insulation products used in Grenfell’s refurbishment were found to be highly flammable. Companies involved—Arconic, Celotex, and Kingspan—concealed the full extent of the fire risks associated with their products, including manipulating test results and misrepresenting data. Arconic, the manufacturer of the cladding, continued to sell its products even after becoming aware of their dangers. Celotex and Kingspan were equally culpable in promoting unsafe insulation materials.
The Grenfell ‘Web Of Blame’, BBC News
The Warning Signs
The Grenfell Tower fire has strong parallels to the Lakanal House fire in 2009, where six people tragically lost their lives due to a combination of unsafe renovations, poor fire safety management, and a lack of fire safety inspections. Like Grenfell, the Lakanal House disaster was exacerbated by combustible materials and systemic failures in fire safety. The fire spread rapidly due to unsafe renovations that compromised compartmentation, a key fire safety feature. Asbestos window panels were replaced with flammable composites, and fire-stopping material was removed, leaving the building vulnerable. Similar to Grenfell, residents were told to stay in their flats based on faulty assumptions about fire containment, resulting in tragic outcomes.
Both fires exposed severe regulatory failures, with unchecked use of unsafe materials and a lack of fire- risk assessments. Despite Lakanal serving as a clear warning, the same issues persisted by the time of Grenfell, leading to further loss of life and renewed calls for fire safety reforms.
The Lakanal House fire of 2009, BBC News
After Grenfell: Dagenham Fire
Recent events, such as the tower block fire in Dagenham, have drawn attention to ongoing fire safety issues in residential buildings across the UK. In Dagenham, the building's "non-compliant" cladding was in the process of being removed when the fire occurred, raising questions about the pace of remediation efforts post-Grenfell. An investigation is underway, and the role of cladding will form part of the inquiry.
Happening seven years after Grenfell, this tragedy acts as a harrowing reminder that we are still not doing enough.
The Dagenham Fire of 2024, Sky News
What Does This Mean For The Construction Industry?
Architects Avoiding The “Recipe For Disaster”
The Grenfell Inquiry makes it clear that architects cannot delegate responsibility for fire safety to others. As lead consultants, architects must ensure that all design elements, materials, and construction practices meet regulatory standards. This includes actively engaging with subcontractors, suppliers, and building control officers to verify that their work is compliant.
A recurring theme in the report is the need for architects to take a more proactive role in managing fire safety, particularly in high-rise buildings. The over-reliance on subcontractors and the assumption that building control acts as a safety net are described as widespread issues within the industry, and a "recipe for disaster.”
The Need for Regulatory Reform
The report's findings highlight serious deficiencies in the regulation of the construction industry, especially concerning fire safety. One of the key recommendations is the establishment of a single regulatory body with oversight of all construction and safety-related matters. This body would have the authority to enforce standards, conduct independent testing, and hold manufacturers accountable for the safety of their products. However, it is important to note that ministers are not obliged to implement the findings of public inquiries so there is not guarantee that these warning will be heeded.
The introduction of the Building Safety Act 2022 has been a significant step forward, particularly for high-rise residential buildings. The Act strengthens building control processes and introduces the concept of the “golden thread,” a digital record ensuring accountability throughout the lifecycle of a building. This is critical for maintaining safety standards from design to ongoing management.
A Call to Action for the Construction Industry
The Grenfell Inquiry has exposed the deep-rooted flaws in the way fire safety is managed within the construction industry. For architects, the key takeaway is clear: the responsibility for ensuring building safety cannot be outsourced or neglected. A thorough understanding of building regulations, combined with proactive engagement in fire safety strategies, is essential to preventing future tragedies.
At Parametrix, we believe in ensuring that all high-risk buildings in the UK are more than just compliant; they must be guaranteed to protect the lives of the residents within.
Our range of services reflects this commitment, as we deliver comprehensive Fire Risk Assessments (FRAs) and EWS1 assessments across the UK, adhering to PAS 79 guidelines and providing Secure Information Box (SIB) plans for enhanced fire safety.
Be aware. Be prepared. Be safe. Contact Parametrix today to learn more about our FRA services.
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